The Failure Experience Improvement System (FEIS) is a software tool that was developed in order to contribute to a minimization of hazardous events and failures within water supply systems and thus to achieve increased water safety. Based on the analysis of failure systems by applying Social Network Analysis (SNA) to the water supply infrastructure, the FEIS enables water utilities to identify causes and effects of failure events and to locate vulnerable points in their infrastructure. Failure events and the relations between them are the basis for the FEIS database. This database draws upon information on failure events which have occurred in practice at water utilities in Austria and on a literature review and survey of guidelines. The FEIS, which is accessed online, is currently used by six Austrian water utilities for development and test purposes. It provides both graphical visualization of the failure network and analytical indicators to evaluate failure events. In this way, it supports the utilities in identifying corrective actions in order to minimize the probability of failure occurrence and to limit the damage to the system once a failure has occurred.
INTRODUCTION
Water supply systems are essential for the functioning of a society and economy and are thus regarded as critical infrastructure (USA Patriot Act ; Commission for the European Communities ). Concepts of total quality management and risk assessment are therefore increasingly being used to assure safe drinking water. The World Health Organization (WHO) stresses the importance of the Water Safety Plan (WSP) concept, which aims at ensuring the safety of drinking water through the use of comprehensive risk identification, assessment and management (WHO Failures in water supply systems can have dramatic con-adequate quantity of high-quality water in a sustainable manner. The term failure in the context of this work therefore includes all events that can lead to the condition of not meeting this objective. Such failures include events that immediately affect water supply, such as pipe or pump failures and the introduction of contaminants into the network, but also actions with indirect or long-term effects on the water supply system, such as insufficient expenditure for mains rehabilitation. In this case, for example, a failure can be defined as the failure to comply with the expenditure level determined by the rehabilitation strategy. Failures in water supply systems often have similar root causes and show similar failure propagation, which can be generalized and corrected. Therefore, there is a high potential to prevent failures in networked infrastructures by failure analysis and by sharing failure experiences with others. The Failure Experience Improvement System (FEIS), which was funded by the Austrian programme for security research, aims to make use of this potential for the water supply sector. This use is achieved by systematic collection of failure causes and their effects in a database, analysis of the resulting failure network and visualization of failure propagation using Social Network Analysis (SNA). Based on the analysis of the failure network in the water supply infrastructure, causal interrelationships can be identified and vulnerable points in the system can be localized. Thus, the FEIS supports risk management by enabling water utilities to identify and assess potential failure events in their water supply system. Consequently, corrective actions can be introduced in order to minimize both the probability of failure occurrence and the damage to the system once a failure has occurred. A permanent minimization of failures and hazards within the water supply system results in increased water safety and contributes to uninterrupted service and crisis prevention.
Failure reporting systems and SNA
The FEIS draws upon two existing concepts: failure reporting systems and SNA. Failure reporting systems have for the first time been used in the aviation industry and were transferred to other industries, such as petrochemical processing, steel production, military operation and healthcare. These so-called Incident Reporting Systems (IRS), which are voluntary and nonpunitive, have been shown to produce large amounts of essential process information unobtainable by other means (Barach & Small ) . Nowadays, more and more safety strategies from industry and especially from aviation are being implemented into healthcare, with anaesthesia being the first profession in healthcare to introduce IRS (Thomeczek & Accordingly, a graph comprises a set of nodes N ¼ {n 1 , n 2 , …, n g } and a set of lines L ¼ {l 1 , l 2 , …, l L }. In addition, values can be added to lines in order to represent the strength or intensity of a relation between two nodes. A valued graph therefore consists of three sets of information: a set of Nodes N, a set of Lines L and a set of Values V ¼ {v 1 , v 2 , …, v L } attached to the lines. Figure 1 shows an example of an unvalued directed graph. These data can also be represented in a two-way matrix of the size g × g. The entry x ij of the matrix equals 1 if node n i is incident to node n j , and 0 otherwise (see Table 1 ). For a valued graph, the elements of the matrix represent the values of the lines between the nodes n i and n j . A detailed introduction to SNA, including notation, graph theory and matrix operations, is provided by Wasserman ().
To the knowledge of the authors, SNA has not previously been applied to investigate failure propagation in water supply systems. A similar approach, the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), has been used to model risks in drinking water supply (Ezell et al. a, b; Risebro et al. ; Rosén et al. ) . A fault tree represents interactions between different events and shows how the events may lead to system failure. In contrast to SNA, however, FTA is a quantitative approach and requires probabilities for each event causing a failure.
DATABASE DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
The FEIS is based on network analysis of failure propagation. 
Collection of failure events and relations
To populate the database with cross-linked failure events two methods were applied. First, a literature review and a survey of guidelines were carried out to collect data on possible failure events. Guidelines and standards usually describe an ideal state of technical infrastructure and operating procedures. They were therefore used to identify discrepancies from these ideal conditions as potential failure events.
Second, data on failures that have occurred in practice were collected from six water utilities using electronic questionnaires. In addition to failures that have actually occurred, so-called 'near miss' events were also included in the data collection. A 'near miss' event is defined as a serious error that has the potential to cause a failure event but fails to do so because of chance or because it is intercepted (WHO ). The project was carried out in cooperation with six water utilities (which supply a total of about 500,000 people) with different supply structures in order to receive a great variety of possible failure events. The collected events were described in short and categorized according to a hierarchical three-part schema: (i) category ('where in the system did the failure event occur'); (ii) system element ('what was affected'); and (iii) failure event ('what happened'). Figure 2 provides an overview of the categories and shows an example of the categorization of a failure event.
After categorization of the collected data, the failure events were cross-linked and visualized using Pajek, a software for performing network analysis (Nooy et al. ) .
During the review of this network, relations were added and adjusted and the properties time lag (see Table 2) and impact (see Table 3 ) were determined for each relation based on the nature of the failure events. For the data collection in the FEIS, the time lag has been defined in rough classes (hours, days, weeks, months). Although it can sometimes be difficult to determine the time lag in cases where the awareness time is quite long (for example, minor pipe breaks, which lead to progressive deterioration of backfill and bedding of pipes), this classification of the time lag should be adequate for the collective database of the FEIS in order to allow some sort of distinction between fast and slow propagating cause-effect chains.
In this manner, a total of about 1,200 event relations were collected and a failure network was established. The resulting network consists of directed graphs; their direction equals the direction of failure propagation, which is in the majority of cases the flow direction of the water through the water supply system. Nodes in the periphery of the network represent events that occur in the beginning of the water supply process (for example, in the groundwater protection n 1 -1 1 0 
ANALYSIS OF FAILURE PROPAGATION AND VISUALIZATION WITH THE FEIS
The features and the user interface of the FEIS tool were discussed and developed in workshops together with the cooperating water utilities. The software tool is accessed The longest path length in the current FEIS database is 18 steps; the average path length is 4.7 steps. The chosen 10-step neighbourhood therefore equals approximately twice the average path length and provides robust results.
As the occurrence of longer paths decreases exponentially with the path length, the calculation of the indicators for larger neighbourhoods would result only in marginal
differences.
An event with a high DI has an effect on many subsequent events. Thus, a node from which many arcs originate has a higher DI than a node with few originating arcs. The calculation only takes the one-step neighbourhood into account. Therefore, events with a high DI pose great risks for their direct neighbourhood, but not necessarily for the overall system. For calculation of the DI, the number of arcs originating from a node is determined:
where x ij is an element of the matrix X and g is the size of the square matrix X.
The DD is the reverse of the DI. An event with a high DD is caused by many events. Thus, a node to which many arcs point has a higher DD than a node which is a receiver of only a few arcs. Failure events with a high DD easily occur if the direct neighbourhood of the node does not function correctly. The DD of a node is given by:
For example, the DI of the node n 1 in Figure 1 is calculated as the sum over the first row of the 4-by-4 matrix X given in Table 1 :
and the DD of the node n 4 is calculated as the sum over the fourth column of the matrix X:
In contrast to the DI, which only takes the one-step neighbourhood into account, the calculation of the SI includes the 10-step neighbourhood of the failure network.
Failure events with a high SI provoke events which in turn have many consequences. If an event with a high SI occurs, it is likely that the consequences affect large sections of the water supply system. For example, the contamination of a well has a higher SI than the contamination that occurs at a single service connection. In order to calculate the SI, paths of length between one and 10 steps have to be considered. The entries of the matrix X k give the number of paths of length k between each pair of nodes. Using the rules for matrix multiplication, the element x
nm of X 2 is calculated as:
where x ni and x im are elements of the matrix X and g is the size of the square matrix X.
According to the Einstein sum convention, an index variable appearing twice implies that one sums over all of its possible values (Ehlotzky ) . Using this convention, the above equation can be written without the summation operator:
Similarly, the element x
nl of X 3 is:
where x ni , x im and x ml are elements of the matrix X.
Therefore, the element x ðkÞ ij of X k can be calculated as:
where x il , x lm , x mn , … x qj are elements of the matrix X and k is the path length.
In order to obtain the SI of a node, the sum over the rows of each matrix X k has to be calculated:
where x ij is an element of the matrix X, g is the size of the square matrix X and k is the path length.
The SD is the reverse of the SI. Failure events with a high SD are caused by events which have in turn many causes. These events are likely to occur more often. The SD of a node is given by:
For example, the SI of the node n 1 in Figure 1 is calculated as the sum over the first row of each matrix X k . The elements x ðkÞ ij of the matrices X k can be calculated according to Equation (10). The element x ð2Þ 13 of the matrix X 2 , for instance, is:
where x ij are the elements of the matrix X given in Equation (4).
In this example, the maximum path length is 3. Therefore, the elements of matrices X k with k > 3 will be 0. The matrices X 2 and X 3 are: and the SI of the node n 1 is given by: 
Similarly, the SD of the node n 4 in Figure 1 is calculated as the sum over the fourth column of each matrix X k : 
The indicators are normalized and mapped as values between 0 and 1. The risk catalogue allows events to be ranked in order of importance according to these indicators and shows high-consequence or high-dependence events. By these means, one can determine how critical an event is in comparison to others and centres of failure-clusters in the system can be localized. Measures at these nodes can eliminate a high failure potential and therefore minimize the probability of failure occurrence. After the next software update, the indicators will be calculated using the impact value to weight the strength of the relations. Thus, the elements x ij of the matrix X will be weighted using data on the impact as given in Table 3 . As a result, the matrix X, which is currently a binary matrix, will contain different entries x ij depending on the impact. This way, the quantification of the indicators will better reflect different probabilities. However, at the time of writing, it is still unclear how the time lag can be included in the calculation in a meaningful way. On the one hand, a failure event that comes into effect after a long delay after being triggered gives the water utility more time to respond to the hazard.
On the other hand, it can be more difficult to identify the root cause of such a failure.
The graphical features of the FEIS include (i) visualization relating to a single event and (ii) visualization for a whole category. In the first case, a single event is selected through the hierarchical three-part schema or a keyword search. The cause-effect chains for the selected event can be visualized for the one-, two-or three-step neighbourhood.
Relations between failure events that have occurred in prac- 
CONCLUSIONS
The present paper describes the design process and the functionality of the FEIS, which enables the user to analyse and visualize failure propagation in water supply systems. It is based on the systematic documentation of failure events and analysis of the relationships between them using SNA.
The FEIS supports: (i) identification of potential failures, (ii) decision making, and (iii) knowledge management.
Identification of potential failures is facilitated by visualization of the failure networks in the water supply infrastructure and importance-ranking of failure events, which highlights critical nodes in the system. This information can be used to support strategic planning of Despite the willingness of the water utilities to use and to contribute to the FEIS due to the potential benefits of failure documentation and analysis, it has been experienced that they were initially reluctant to use the term failure.
Communication and open discussion of failure events are a delicate issue, especially in water supply because of the fear of creating insecurity among consumers. Moreover, the reporter of a failure event might be at risk of blame.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that reports are anonymous and to encourage water utilities and their staff to report a wide range of failure events. An open-minded handling of failure events and a strong organizational culture of continuous learning is necessary for successful risk minimization. The FEIS can also be used to train staff by visualizing the impact of failure events and thus to develop awareness of the importance of failure management. Failure analysis and management also have great potential in other infrastructures. Consequently, the possibility of transferring the FEIS approach to other areas of infrastructure (for example, wastewater or gas infrastructure) should be investigated.
